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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a lawyer sitting in her office in Lincoln, Nebraska, when a
client walks in—her name is Mary. Mary tells the lawyer the follow-
ing story about her husband, Lloyd. Lloyd was experiencing horrific
pain in his throat and chest one day while driving a client to the air-
port in his limousine. Due to the pain, he decided he needed to see a
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doctor. He went to see Dr. Harry Dunne, who told him that he should
not be worried and diagnosed him with gastroesophageal reflux dis-
ease, more commonly known as acid reflux. Dr. Dunne told Lloyd to
stay away from spicy and fatty foods and to take some over-the-
counter antacid medicine. At first, these suggestions helped, and
Lloyd continued with life as normal. Approximately a year later, Lloyd
started coughing up blood and having severe pain in his throat and
chest. Extremely concerned, he returned to Dr. Dunne who immedi-
ately sent Lloyd to get x-rays and a throat biopsy. The test determined
that Lloyd had hypopharyngeal cancer, a type of throat cancer.
Shortly after that, Lloyd died as a result of the cancer.
The lawyer decided to take the case. Through expert witnesses, the
lawyer determined that if Dr. Dunne had correctly diagnosed the can-
cer on the first try, Lloyd would have had a 49% chance of survival.
However, after the delayed treatment, Lloyd only had a 10% chance of
survival. The experts also helped the lawyer determine that Dr.
Dunne breached the standard of care and that he was the direct and
proximate cause of the lost chance of survival. Knowing all of this,
what should the lawyer do? Can Mary recover any damages for Lloyd’s
wrongful death?
This hypothetical is an example of a traditional “loss of chance”
case where the patient’s original chance of survival was less than 50%.
The loss of chance doctrine is a tort theory that allows plaintiffs to
recover damages for their lost chance of survival or chance of a better
outcome.1 The problem for Mary is that she lives in Nebraska, one of
the few states that does not recognize recovery under the loss of
chance doctrine.
This Comment examines the loss of chance doctrine and its differ-
ent permutations. It argues that Nebraska should adopt the “distinct
compensable injury” approach to the loss of chance doctrine to allow
patients to recover damages when their original chance of survival or
better outcome is less than 50%. Nebraska should adopt this form of
the loss of chance doctrine because it is consistent with traditional tort
law principles and it provides vulnerable patients with a form of re-
covery that can help protect them from the negligence of their health-
care professionals. Most importantly, the reasons the Nebraska
Supreme Court previously listed in opposition to the loss of chance
doctrine are not persuasive.
Part II of this Comment will survey the history and the three dis-
tinct approaches to the loss of chance doctrine: the “all or nothing”
approach, the “relaxed standard of proof” approach, and the “distinct
compensable injury” approach. Part III will examine the status of the
1. See Steven R. Koch, Comment, Whose Loss Is It Anyway? Effects of the “Lost-
Chance” Doctrine on Civil Litigation and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 88 N.C.
L. REV. 595, 598–603 (2010).
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loss of chance doctrine in Nebraska. Part IV will analyze why the Ne-
braska Supreme Court is misguided in refusing to adopt the loss of
chance doctrine and will also discuss the policy reasons supporting
Nebraska’s adoption of the loss of chance doctrine.
II. THE LOSS OF CHANCE DOCTRINE AND ITS DIFFERENT
PERMUTATIONS
The loss of chance doctrine is a legal theory that has been accepted
and applied in a majority of states.2 However, not all courts are will-
ing to accept the so-called “radical” doctrine. The doctrine “has been
described as ‘the most pernicious example of a new tort action result-
2. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984); Ferrell v.
Rosenbaum, 691 A.2d 641 (D.C. 1997); Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535
(Ind. 2000); DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986); Delaney v. Cade,
873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994); Hastings v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So. 2d 713
(La. 1986); Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2013); Wol-
len v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1992); Perez v. Las Vegas Med.
Ctr., 805 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1991); Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279 (N.M. 1999);
McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987); Smith v. Provi-
dence Health & Servs.—Or., 393 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2017); Hamil v. Bashline, 392
A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978); Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash.
1983); McMackin v. Johnson Cty. Healthcare Ctr., 73 P.3d 1094 (Wyo. 2003).
Overall, twenty-seven states have adopted the loss of chance doctrine: Arizona,
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming; twelve states have refused
to adopt the loss of chance doctrine: Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky,
Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Ver-
mont; and a few states have not examined the loss of chance doctrine or have
deferred it to the legislature. See, e.g., Estate of Frey v. Mastroianni, 463 P.3d
1197 (Haw. 2020) (holding that loss of chance could be considered in causation
analysis); Lord v. Lovett, 770 A.2d 1103 (N.H. 2001) (adopting the doctrine in
New Hampshire); Smith, 393 P.3d 1106 (adopting the doctrine in Oregon);
Lauren Guest, David Schap & Thi Tran, The “Loss of Chance” Rule as a Special
Category of Damages in Medical Malpractice: A State-by-State Analysis, 21 J. LE-
GAL ECON. 53, 59 tbl.1 (2015). The Michigan Supreme Court adopted the loss of
chance doctrine. Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990). However,
the Michigan legislature later amended its medical malpractice statute to state
that a “plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportu-
nity to achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%.”
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912a(2) (Westlaw through P.A. 2020, No. 164, of
the 2020 Regular Session, 100th Legislature) (effective Apr. 1, 1994). Connecticut
also applied the loss of chance doctrine but retained the requirement that the
decedent “had at least a 51 percent chance of survival” before the negligence.
Boone v. William W. Backus Hosp., 864 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2005). The South Dakota
Supreme Court also adopted the loss of chance doctrine before its ruling was ab-
rogated by statute. See Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366 (S.D. 2000), abro-
gated by S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-1.1 (Westlaw through laws of the 2021
Regular Session effective February 17, 2021).
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ing in expanded liability.’”3 The loss of chance doctrine is a cause of
action that is almost unique to medical malpractice litigation; it al-
lows “a patient-turned-plaintiff to recover damages from a doctor-
turned-defendant without even needing to establish that the doctor
was . . . [the proximate cause of] the patient’s alleged injury.”4 The law
surrounding the loss of chance doctrine can be difficult to navigate due
to the drastically different approaches taken by courts around the
country.5
The loss of chance doctrine in medical malpractice cases tradition-
ally applies when a doctor decreased an injured or ill patient’s chance
of (1) surviving or (2) recovering.6 With regard to the first situation,
the patient succumbs to the illness, and “the loss suffered is the lost
chance of surviving the preexisting injury or illness or at least a
chance of a substantial increase in the length of such survival.”7 The
majority of cases that involve the loss of chance doctrine fall into this
category.8 The second category includes cases that involve patients
who do survive but do not recover as fully as they should have because
of medical malpractice.9
A. Origins of the Loss of Chance Doctrine
Surprisingly, the earliest known example of the loss of chance doc-
trine is not a medical malpractice case; instead, it is an English con-
tracts case, Chaplin v. Hicks.10 In Chaplin, the defendant, Hicks, was
a “well-known actor and theatrical manager.”11 Hicks invited women
to submit their photographs to a local newspaper as part of a beauty
3. Koch, supra note 1, at 598.
4. Id. But see Washington v. Am. Cmty. Stores Corp., 196 Neb. 624, 244 N.W.2d 286
(1976) (applying loss of chance doctrine to loss of future earnings damages);
Chaplin v. Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786 (Eng.) (applying loss of chance doctrine to
breach of contract case); David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605 (2001) (examining the multiple areas of law to which
the loss of chance doctrine has been applied).
5. Delaney, 873 P.2d 175 (applying the “relaxed standard of proof approach” to the
loss of chance doctrine); Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 2008)
(applying the “distinct compensable injury” standard to the loss of chance doc-
trine); Cohan v. Med. Imaging Consultants, P.C., 297 Neb. 111, 900 N.W.2d 732
(2017) (rejecting the loss of chance doctrine and applying the traditional “all or
nothing” approach); see also Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 279 (Ind. 2000)
(“[L]oss of chance is better understood as a description of the injury than as either
a term for a separate cause of action or a surrogate for the causation element of a
negligence claim.”).




10. Chaplin v. Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786 (Eng.); see also Fischer, supra note 4, at 607–09
(examining the origins of the loss of chance doctrine and Chaplin).
11. Chaplin, 2 KB at 786.
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competition.12 The readers of the newspaper would then vote on fifty
finalists, and the finalists would be entitled to present themselves to
be personally judged by Hicks in hopes of being selected for one of
twelve prizes.13 The plaintiff submitted her photo and was selected as
one of the finalists.14 A letter was sent to her, but she never received
it.15 Therefore, the plaintiff alleged that the contract had been
breached because she did not have the chance to present herself to be
personally judged as the contest promised.16 The jury awarded her
£100 for the lost chance of winning one of the twelve prizes.17 Hicks
appealed, stating the damages were too speculative.18 However, the
appellate court affirmed the lower court’s findings and held that her
loss of chance to win a prize was a right that had value and for which
the trier of fact should determine the amount of damages.19
The more contentious application of the loss of chance doctrine is in
the negligence context where, unlike breach of contract claims, “causa-
tion . . . is an element of the cause of action.”20 The most controversial
use is in medical malpractice situations where a “plaintiff cannot
prove by a preponderance of evidence that defendant caused tradi-
tional damage.”21 One of the earliest cases, and perhaps the most
cited by courts adopting the loss of chance doctrine in the medical mal-
practice context, is Hicks v. United States.22 In Hicks, a doctor negli-
gently failed to diagnose a patient’s illness, and, as a result, the
patient died.23 The defendant argued that Hicks’s estate could not
prove the misdiagnosis caused her death.24 However, the court re-
jected this argument, stating:
When a defendant’s negligent action or inaction has effectively terminated a
person’s chance of survival, it does not lie in the defendant’s mouth to raise
conjectures as to the measure of the chances that he has put beyond the possi-
bility of realization. If there was any substantial possibility of survival and
the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable. Rarely is it possible to
demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have happened in circum-
stances that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to pass. The law does not in
the existing circumstances require the plaintiff to show to a certainty that the
12. Id. at 786–87.
13. Id. at 787.
14. Id. at 787–88.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 788.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 790–93, 797.
20. Fischer, supra note 4, at 609.
21. Id.
22. Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
23. Id. at 628.
24. Id.
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patient would have lived had she been hospitalized and operated on
promptly.25
Hicks “has come to be cited for the proposition that traditional notions
of ‘more likely than not’ causation pose a problematic barrier to recov-
ery by patients who have experienced poor medical outcomes due to a
doctor’s failure to diagnose and that other theories of recovery may be
viable.”26
One of the first cases to unequivocally use the modern formulation
of the loss of chance doctrine as a theory of recovery in a medical mal-
practice case was Hamil v. Bashline.27 In Hamil, “the plaintiff put on
expert testimony that the decedent had a 75 percent chance of surviv-
ing his heart attack with proper treatment.”28 The defendant rebutted
this idea by offering “evidence that the decedent’s death was immi-
nent, regardless of treatment.”29 The trial court ruled in favor of the
defendant, holding that the “plaintiff had failed to establish this negli-
gence as a proximate cause of the decedent’s death.”30 The plaintiff
appealed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-examined the is-
sue.31 In deciding the case, the court examined section 323 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, as well as Hicks.32 In the court’s
reasoning, it explained that the loss of chance doctrine is a doctrine
that relaxes the standard of proof required by traditional tort princi-
ples.33 This facilitates claims so long as there is evidence that the “in-
creased risk was . . . a substantial factor in bringing about the
resultant harm.”34 The approach adopted by the court in Hamil is
known as the relaxed standard of proof approach and is only followed
25. Id. at 632 (citing Harvey v. Silber, 2 N.W.2d 483 (Mich. 1942)).
26. Smith v. Providence Health & Servs.—Or., 393 P.3d 1106, 1112 (Or. 2017). It is
surprising to see so many courts cite to Hicks because, unlike the modern uses of
loss of chance, the case “did not actually involve proof of less than a 51 percent
chance that the correct diagnosis would have” resulted in Hicks living. Id.
27. Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978); see also George J. Zilich, Note, Cut-
ting Through the Confusion of the Loss-of-Chance Doctrine Under Ohio Law: A
New Cause of Action or a New Standard of Causation?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 673,
697–98 (2002) (examining Hamil and its use of the loss of chance doctrine).
28. Smith, 393 P.3d at 1112.
29. Id.
30. Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1283–84.
31. Id. at 1280, 1282–83.
32. Id. at 1286–88. Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: “One
who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his
failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to
exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered
because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 323 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
33. Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1286.
34. Id. at 1288.
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in a few states.35 Though some states cling to this approach, two other
approaches have been consistently adopted: (1) the all or nothing ap-
proach, and (2) the distinct compensable injury approach.
B. The All or Nothing Approach
In a medical malpractice action under traditional tort principles, a
plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the doctor owed the patient a
duty; (2) the doctor breached that duty; (3) the doctor’s breach caused
the injury; and (4) the plaintiff actually suffered some form of injury.36
In loss of chance cases, the plaintiff generally has the most considera-
ble difficulty proving that the doctor caused the injury.37 Traditional
tort law principles “require[ ] the plaintiff to prove causation by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.”38 Causation is proven by showing that
the doctor’s actions were both the cause in fact and the proximate
cause of the patient’s injury.39 “Under this standard, a plaintiff must
prove that it is more likely than not that the defendant’s negligence
caused the patient’s injury.”40 If the plaintiff is unable to show that it
is more likely than not that the defendant caused the injury, then he
or  she cannot recover.41 This standard is known as the all or nothing
approach.42
“The all-or-nothing approach is the traditional rule” and essen-
tially denies the adoption of the loss of chance doctrine.43 This is be-
cause, under the all or nothing approach, plaintiffs can never recover
for a loss of chance and can only recover when the defendant more
likely than not caused the ultimate injury to the plaintiff.44 One case
often cited by courts applying the traditional all or nothing approach
35. See Smith v. Providence Health & Servs.—Or., 393 P.3d 1106, 1113 (Or. 2017)
(listing the jurisdictions that follow the relaxed standard of proof approach).
36. See Hamilton v. Bares, 267 Neb. 816, 678 N.W.2d 74 (2004) (explaining medical
malpractice principles in Nebraska); Patrick L. Evatt, Note, A Closer Look at Loss
of Chance Under Nebraska Medical Malpractice Law: Steineke v. Share Health
Plan, Inc., 246 Neb. 374, 518 N.W.2d 904 (1994), 76 NEB. L. REV. 979, 981 (1997);
see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
164–65 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (examining the common law negli-
gence principles).
37. Evatt, supra note 36, at 981.
38. Id. at 981–82.
39. Hamilton, 267 Neb. at 821, 678 N.W.2d at 79 (citing Neill v. Hemphill, 258 Neb.
949, 607 N.W.2d 500 (2000); Snyder v. Contemporary Obstetrics & Gynecology,
P.C., 258 Neb. 643, 605 N.W.2d 782 (2000)); 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS
269 (2001).
40. Evatt, supra note 36, at 982.
41. Id. at 983.
42. See id. at 981–83.
43. Id. at 983; see Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE
L.J. 1353 (1981).
44. See King, supra note 43, at 1356.
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is Jones v. Owings.45 In Owings, the plaintiff was being treated by the
defendant for a fractured femur.46 Before they could perform surgery,
the plaintiff had to have “a pre-operative chest x-ray.”47 The radiolo-
gist noted in his report an abnormal spot in the plaintiff’s left lung and
recommended that the patient have a follow-up x-ray or a computed
tomography scan.48 A year later, the patient returned and another
chest x-ray was ordered; as before, the radiologist noted an issue with
the left lung.49 Again the doctor did nothing.50 Finally, after another
year passed, the plaintiff was diagnosed with lung cancer and died
shortly thereafter.51 Experts testified that if the plaintiff had been ap-
propriately diagnosed when the radiologist first noted the spot in her
left lung, she would have had almost a 50% chance of survival.52 How-
ever, by the time she was properly diagnosed, she only had a 15%-20%
chance of survival.53
After reviewing the loss of chance doctrine, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina refused to adopt the doctrine and instead held fast to
the traditional all or nothing approach.54 The court relied on language
from the Ohio Supreme Court, which stated:
Lesser standards of proof are understandably attractive in malpractice cases
where physical well being, and life itself, are the subject of litigation. The
strong intuitive sense of humanity tends to emotionally direct us toward a
conclusion that in an action for wrongful death an injured person should be
compensated for the loss of any chance of survival, regardless of its remote-
ness. However, we have trepidations that such a rule would be so loose that it
would produce more injustice than justice. Even though there exists authority
for a rule allowing recovery based upon proof of causation by evidence not
meeting the standard of probability, we are not persuaded by their logic. We
consider the better rule to be that in order to comport with the standard of
proof of proximate cause, plaintiff in a malpractice case must prove that de-
fendant’s negligence, in probability, proximately caused the death.55
The court refused to adopt the loss of chance doctrine because it “is
fundamentally at odds with the requisite degree of medical certitude
necessary to establish a causal link between the injury of a patient
and the tortious conduct of a physician.”56 Furthermore, it stated that
“[l]egal responsibility [under the loss of chance doctrine] is in reality
45. Evatt, supra note 36, at 982.








54. Id. at 372–74.
55. Id. at 373–74 (quoting Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Ohio
1971)).
56. Id. at 374 (quoting Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 602 (Tenn. 1993)).
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assigned based on the mere possibility that a tortfeasor’s negligence
was a cause of the ultimate harm.”57 In sum, the court noted that the
loss of chance doctrine “is contrary to the most basic standards of proof
which undergird the tort system.”58
Owings is the prototypical loss of chance case where the plaintiff
had an original chance of survival or better outcome of less than 50%,
and some act by the doctor decreased that chance.59 According to the
all or nothing approach, plaintiffs who can demonstrate that the de-
fendant was more than 50% liable for the outcome will recover all
their damages.60 However, plaintiffs who cannot demonstrate that the
defendant more likely than not caused the damage will recover no
damages.61 In this latter scenario, if the plaintiff is only able to prove
a 49% chance of survival to begin with (even if the illness had been
properly diagnosed on the first try) but still a 51% chance of death,
then the court will conclude the doctor was not the cause of the injury
because even with a proper diagnosis it was still more likely than not
that the plaintiff would die.62 This approach led to the dissatisfaction
of plaintiffs and plaintiff-sympathetic courts and caused the emer-
gence of the loss of chance doctrine.63 Overall, plaintiffs are more
likely to be fairly compensated for damages caused by negligent doc-
tors in courts that have adopted the loss of chance doctrine.64
C. The Relaxed Standard of Proof Approach
The relaxed standard of proof is the minority approach for states
that have adopted the loss of chance doctrine, with only a few states
57. Id. (citing Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 405 (Tex. 1993)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 372–74.
60. Alice Férot, The Theory of Loss of Chance: Between Reticence and Acceptance, 8
FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 591, 607–08 (2013); see also Kilpatrick, 868 S.W.2d at 607
(Daughtrey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The traditional view
of proximate cause in a medical malpractice action requires proof that the injury
suffered by the patient would not have occurred but for the negligence of the
defendant. Where the negligence of the defendant is not the only cause of the
injury, this standard means that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was
at least 51 percent responsible for the outcome. Under what has been called the
‘all-or-nothing approach’ of allocating damages under this rule, a plaintiff who
successfully meets the 51 percent standard recovers 100 percent of the damages
from the defendant, even though the defendant may have been only partly re-
sponsible for the result. Conversely, a plaintiff who can establish only that the
defendant was 50 percent responsible (or less) collects nothing from the
tortfeasor.” (footnote omitted)).
61. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
2021] LOSS OF CHANCE DOCTRINE 1023
following this approach.65 The relaxed standard of proof is best de-
fined by the Kansas Supreme Court, which stated:
The relaxed standard of proof approach . . . requires plaintiff to present evi-
dence that a substantial or significant chance of survival or better recovery
was lost. If plaintiff meets this initial threshold, the causation issue is submit-
ted to the jury, using the traditional proximate cause standard to ascertain
whether, in fact, the alleged malpractice resulted in the loss of a substantial
or significant chance. Thus, the jury must find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the lost chance,
but the lost chance itself need only be a substantial or significant chance for a
better result, absent any malpractice, rather than a greater than 50 percent
chance of a better result.66
As the court in Delaney explains, the relaxed standard of proof ap-
proach eliminates the traditional notions of proximate cause for ana-
lyzing the plaintiff’s reduced chances of survival or recovery, instead
choosing to adopt a substantial or significant causation approach.67
However, courts have failed to clearly define what a substantial or
significant decrease in a chance of survival or better recovery is, and
instead, leave it up to the trier of fact to decide.68
McKellips v. Saint Francis Hospital, Inc. is an example of a court
adopting and applying the relaxed standard of proof approach.69 In
McKellips, a widow brought a wrongful death suit against Saint Fran-
cis Hospital for negligently causing the death of her husband.70 The
decedent was brought to the emergency room after “complain[ing] of
pain over his breastbone radiating to both sides of his chest.”71 The
doctor wrongfully diagnosed the decedent with gastritis and released
him shortly after.72 A few hours later, the decedent suffered cardiac
arrest and passed away.73 “At trial, [the plaintiffs’] expert witness, a
board certified emergency physician, testified by deposition that [the
defendants] were negligent in diagnosing decedent as suffering from
gastritis instead of a heart attack, and in releasing him rather than
keeping him under observation for a reasonable period of time at the
65. See McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972); Jeanes v. Milner, 428
F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970); Blackmon v. Langley, 737 S.W.2d 455 (Ark. 1987); Dela-
ney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d
589 (Nev. 1991); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1974); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987);
Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
66. Delaney, 873 P.2d at 184.
67. Id.
68. See id. (citing McBride, 462 F.2d 72; Jeanes, 428 F.2d 598; Blackmon, 737 S.W.2d
455; Perez, 805 P.2d 589; Kallenberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508; McKellips, 741 P.2d 467;
Herskovits, 664 P.2d 474).
69. McKellips, 741 P.2d 467.
70. Id. at 469–70.
71. Id. at 470.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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hospital.”74 Additionally, the expert testified that, based on the dece-
dent’s hospital records, the “ ‘heart attack was probably well underway
at the time of his visit to the emergency department the first time’ and
admitting decedent to the hospital for observation at that time would
not have prevented the heart attack.”75 As for the decedent’s chances
of survival the expert stated:
As far as improving his chances, I think unquestionably his chances would
have been significantly improved. As to whether or not it would have, in fact,
changed the outcome, I think is a statistical probability statement that is diffi-
cult to answer. But as far as improving his chances, there’s no question that
that’s true.76
“At the conclusion of [the plaintiffs’] evidence,” the defendants as-
serted that the plaintiffs failed to prove causation and “moved for a
directed verdict.”77 “The district court granted the motion,” and the
plaintiffs appealed.78 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certi-
fied two questions of law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.79 In es-
sence, the questions asked the court whether it had adopted the loss of
chance doctrine and “[i]f the loss of chance doctrine is recognized in
Oklahoma, [whether] expert testimony that ‘unquestionably [stated
the deceased’s] chances would have been significantly improved’ [was]
sufficient under that doctrine to create a question for the jury.”80 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the loss of chance doctrine, stating:
[I]n those situations where a health care provider deprives a patient of a sig-
nificant chance for recovery by negligently failing to provide medical treat-
ment, the health care professional should not be allowed to come in after the
fact and allege that the result was inevitable inasmuch as that person put the
patient’s chance beyond the possibility of realization. Health care providers
should not be given the benefit of the uncertainty created by their own negli-
gent conduct. To hold otherwise would in effect allow care providers to evade
liability for their negligent actions or inactions in situations in which patients
would not necessarily have survived or recovered, but still would have a sig-
nificant chance of survival or recovery.81
Regarding the second question, the court further stated that an ex-
pert’s testimony does not need to be expressed in precise percentages
but that such testimony, combined with the evidence, has to establish







79. Id. at 469.
80. Id. (alteration in original).
81. Id. at 474.
82. Id. at 475.
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Delaney v. Cade is another example of a court applying the relaxed
standard of proof approach.83 Much like McKellips, Delaney involves a
federal court of appeals certifying a question to a state court related to
the loss of chance doctrine.84 In Delaney, the plaintiff was involved in
a car accident.85 As a result of the accident, the plaintiff suffered mul-
tiple injuries, including a transected aorta.86 The plaintiff was taken
to the hospital, where she complained of chest pains.87 “The plaintiff
allege[d] Dr. Cade commenced suturing the lacerations on her knees
without performing a physical examination, ordering x-rays, or start-
ing [intravenous therapy].”88 Two hours later, the plaintiff was trans-
ferred to another hospital.89 After she arrived at the second hospital,
the doctors learned that her transected aorta had clotted, and as a
result of the clotted aorta, the plaintiff was permanently paralyzed.90
The plaintiff’s expert testified:
[T]en percent of patients with thoracic aortic injuries like [the plaintiff] will
suffer permanent paralysis regardless of how the injury is managed. If the
plaintiff was in that ten percent, she would have been a paraplegic no matter
how much time passed between the accident and surgery. In addition, [the
expert] testified he had no way of determining whether the plaintiff was in
that ten percent or in the other ninety percent. However, [the expert] did state
that the plaintiff’s risk of [spinal] cord injury was increased five to ten percent
by the prolonged period of shock that she suffered prior to surgery.91
The Kansas Supreme Court adopted the loss of chance doctrine and
stated that the evidence produced was enough to submit the questions
of causation to the jury because “the question of causation is generally
a matter to be determined by the finder of fact.”92 In adopting the
relaxed standard of proof approach, the court listed the elements that
the plaintiff must prove to succeed on the claim:
In an action to recover for the loss of a chance to survive or for the loss of a
chance for a better recovery, the plaintiff must first prove the traditional ele-
ments of a medical malpractice action by a preponderance of the evidence. The
plaintiff must prove that the defendant was negligent in treating the patient,
that the negligence caused harm to the plaintiff, and that as a result the
83. Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994).
84. Id. at 177.
85. Id.
86. Id. A transected aorta “is the near-complete tear through all the layers of the
aorta due to trauma such as that sustained in a motor vehicle collision or a fall.
This condition is most often lethal and requires immediate medical attention.”
Traumatic Aortic Transection (Aortic Rupture), CEDARS-SINAI, https://
www.cedars-sinai.edu/Patients/Health-Conditions/Traumatic-Aortic-Transec-
tion-Aortic-Rupture.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/RD5N-HZ5Y] (last visited Feb.
22, 2021).




91. Id. at 177–78.
92. Id. at 186.
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plaintiff suffered damages. In proving that the plaintiff suffered harm, the
plaintiff must prove that the lost chance of survival or the lost chance for a
better recovery when the plaintiff does survive was a substantial loss of the
chance.93
The method used for calculating damages under this approach is
what sets it apart from the other approaches. Under the relaxed stan-
dard of proof approach, damages are not calculated based on the per-
centage lost by the plaintiff; instead, plaintiffs can recover all the
damages they could recover under a traditional negligence claim, even
though they are not able to show that the defendant is liable for these
damages by a preponderance of the evidence.94 This is because the
courts do not define a new injury for a loss of chance claim but relax
the traditional standard of causation instead.95 The relaxed standard
of proof approach is only used in a minority of jurisdictions, and it
appears courts are reluctant to adopt this approach because it ignores
traditional tort principles.96
D. The Distinct Compensable Injury Approach
The distinct compensable injury approach is the majority approach
in states that have adopted the loss of chance doctrine.97 This ap-
proach follows traditional tort law principles and is by far the most
well-reasoned approach to the loss of chance doctrine. Jurisdictions
that have adopted the distinct compensable injury approach “treat the
reduction of a patient’s chance of recovery or survival as a distinct
injury,” providing damages solely for the percentage of chance lost by
the defendant’s negligence.98 This is because courts following this ap-
proach “view[ ] a person’s prospects for surviving a serious medical
condition as something of value, even if the possibility of recovery was
less than even prior to the physician’s tortious conduct.”99 This is a
cornerstone idea for courts that have adopted this approach and is fur-
ther explained in Matsuyama, where the Massachusetts Supreme
Court adopted the distinct compensable injury approach and stated:
93. Id. at 185–86.
94. See Evatt, supra note 36, at 983–84; Férot, supra note 60, at 615–16; Zilich, supra
note 27, at 682–83.
95. Zilich, supra note 27, at 682 (“[C]ourts [that have adopted the relaxed standing of
proof approach] have relaxed either the standard of proof required or the suffi-
ciency of the evidence called for rather than defining the injury as the loss of
chance for a better result.” (footnote omitted)).
96. See Férot, supra note 60, at 615–16.
97. See Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272 (Ind. 2000); DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393
N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986); Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 2008);
Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2013); Smith v. Provi-
dence Health & Servs.—Or., 393 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2017); Herskovits v. Grp. Health
Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
98. Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 334–35.
99. Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 823.
2021] LOSS OF CHANCE DOCTRINE 1027
[The] probability of survival is part of the patient’s condition. When a physi-
cian’s negligence diminishes or destroys a patient’s chance of survival, the pa-
tient has suffered real injury. The patient has lost something of great value: a
chance to survive, to be cured, or otherwise to achieve a more favorable medi-
cal outcome. Thus we recognize loss of chance not as a theory of causation, but
as a theory of injury.100
Matsuyama is by far the most cited case by courts that have
adopted the distinct compensable injury approach to loss of chance. In
Matsuyama, the defendant had been Matsuyama’s physician for more
than four years.101 Due to this extended time of treatment, the defen-
dant was aware that Matsuyama had been suffering from gastric pain
for multiple years.102 The defendant was also aware that Matsuyama
carried several risk factors for gastric cancer.103 Even though the de-
fendant was aware of these critical facts, he did not order any tests to
detect gastric cancer.104 Eventually, after Matsuyama developed
moles on his body and reported severe stomach pain, the defendant
ordered a test for a bacteria associated with gastric cancer.105 The test
came back positive, but again the defendant did not request further
tests to ascertain whether Matsuyama had gastric cancer.106 Only
when Matsuyama later complained of more severe symptoms did the
defendant order additional testing.107 The tests ascertained that there
was a cancerous mass in Matsuyama’s stomach.108 The delayed treat-
ment of the gastric cancer resulted in Matsuyama’s death.109 Mat-
suyama’s estate brought suit against the defendant.110
Experts provided conflicting evidence and ultimately were unable
to determine what chance of survival the victim had before the
delayed diagnosis, but agreed that the chances of survival diminished
with time.111 The jury found the defendant negligent and awarded the
estate loss of chance damages.112 In explaining why the court
awarded damages and adopted the distinct compensable injury ap-
proach, the court stated:
Recognizing loss of chance as a theory of injury is consistent with our law of
causation, which requires that plaintiffs establish causation by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. In order to prove loss of chance, a plaintiff must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the physician’s negligence caused the
100. Id. at 832 (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 824–25.
102. Id. at 824.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 824–25.
105. Id.




110. Id. at 819.
111. Id. at 825–27.
112. Id. at 827–28.
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plaintiff’s likelihood of achieving a more favorable outcome to be diminished.
That is, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
physician’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury, where the injury consists
of the diminished likelihood of achieving a more favorable medical outcome.
The loss of chance doctrine, so delineated, makes no amendment or exception
to the burdens of proof applicable in all negligence claims.113
Furthermore, the court in Matsuyama, unlike some other courts,
stated that to bring a claim for loss of chance, the injury need not re-
sult in a patient’s death.114
Matsuyama points out another critical component of the distinct
compensable injury approach: to succeed under this approach, a plain-
tiff must still prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defen-
dant caused the injury.115 However, it is essential to note that the
injury is not the death of the patient but the chance of survival or a
better outcome that the patient lost.116 Some courts have relied on
section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to justify this ap-
proach.117 This section provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertak-
ing, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the
undertaking.118
In DeBurkarte v. Louvar, a wife and husband brought a malprac-
tice action.119 The court found that the doctor was negligent when he
evaluated a lump in the wife’s breast and only ordered a mam-
mogram.120 Only after another lump formed did he finally send her to
a surgeon for a biopsy.121 The doctor appealed the finding of negli-
gence, disputing the strength of the evidence and the sufficiency of the
proof supporting the damages that were awarded.122 “The plaintiff’s
experts . . . testified that the earlier a cancer is discovered, the higher
the probability a patient may be cured.”123 Relying on section 323, the
court reasoned that this evidence could be introduced because “the Re-
statement indicates[ ] her injury may also be viewed as a lost chance
113. Id. at 832–33 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 832.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
119. DeBurkarte, 393 N.W.2d 131.
120. Id. at 132.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 135.
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to survive cancer.”124 “The jury could then find from the evidence that
the defendant’s failure to diagnose and treat the cancer probably
caused a substantial reduction in the plaintiff’s chance to survive
it.”125
Another example of a court adopting the distinct compensable in-
jury approach to the loss of chance doctrine is Smith v. Providence
Health.126 In Smith, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit
against a doctor and the hospital.127 The plaintiff went to the emer-
gency room after he began experiencing visual difficulties, slurred
speech, mental confusion, and a headache.128 The defendant ex-
amined the plaintiff but failed to “perform a complete physical exami-
nation or a thorough neurological examination.”129 The defendant
concluded that the plaintiff’s symptoms were caused by taking a sleep-
ing aid.130 The following night the plaintiff returned to the hospital,
and the defendant doctor was again working.131 The plaintiff again
complained of head pain and visual problems.132 The doctor again dis-
charged the plaintiff.133 A few days later, a magnetic resonance imag-
ing scan (MRI) was finally ordered, but the scan was not performed
until the end of the week.134 The MRI discovered significant brain
damage caused by a stroke.135 The plaintiff was left with slurred
speech, inability to perform daily tasks, and inability to work.136 The
plaintiff “alleged that ‘[a]s a result of the negligence of [the defend-
ants], on a more probable than not basis, [the plaintiff] lost a chance
for treatment which, 33 percent of the time, provides a much better
outcome, with reduced or no stroke symptoms.’”137 The Oregon Su-
preme Court ruled that the plaintiff could recover damages because “a
loss of a substantial chance of a better medical outcome can be a cogni-
zable injury in a common-law claim of medical malpractice in
Oregon.”138
The distinct compensable injury approach is also applied to cases
that result in an increased chance of recurrence of an illness. In
Dickhoff, the patient’s parents brought a medical malpractice action
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Smith v. Providence Health & Servs.—Or., 393 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2017).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1107–08.









138. Id. at 1121.
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claiming that the defendants negligently failed to diagnose their
child’s cancer.139 The trial court awarded summary judgment to the
defendants.140 The court of appeals reversed and held that the trial
court erred in awarding summary judgment to the defendants.141 The
court of appeals reasoned that Minnesota law permits recovery for
“loss of chance” in a medical malpractice action even if the patient did
not pass away.142 The Minnesota Supreme Court further explained
that the parents created a genuine issue of material fact on the issue
of causation because the parents’ expert “assert[ed] that [the defend-
ants’] failure to timely diagnose [the] cancer caused a substantial in-
crease in the likelihood that [the] cancer would recur and decreased
[the child’s] chances of survival by at least 20 percent.”143
The expert reasoned in his affidavit that due to the delayed diagno-
sis, the child would likely need additional treatment to combat the
recurrence of her cancer that would not have been necessary following
a correct diagnosis the first time.144 The parents also produced testi-
mony that showed it was “more probable than not” that the child’s lost
chance of survival was a result of the defendants’ negligence.145 The
Minnesota court followed reasoning similar to other courts that had
adopted the distinct compensable injury approach, stating:
[The Supreme Court of Minnesota] agree[s] with those courts that treat the
reduction of a patient’s chance of recovery or survival as a distinct injury. It
should be beyond dispute that a patient regards a chance to survive or achieve
a more favorable medical outcome as something of value. . . . “When a physi-
cian’s negligence diminishes or destroys a patient’s chance of survival, the pa-
tient has suffered real injury. The patient has lost something of great value: a
chance to survive, to be cured, or otherwise to achieve a more favorable medi-
cal outcome.” . . . [A] physician harms a patient by negligently depriving her of
a chance of recovery or survival and should be liable for the value of that lost
chance.146
The distinct compensable injury approach provides a basis for
courts to adopt the loss of chance doctrine without ignoring traditional
tort principles. Put another way, it provides courts that are reluctant
to adopt the relaxed standard of proof approach with a way to allow
injured plaintiffs to recover damages against negligent defendants
while still requiring them to prove their damages by a preponderance
of the evidence.
139. Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2013).
140. Id. at 324.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 328.
143. Id. at 337.
144. Id. at 337–38.
145. Id. at 338.
146. Id. at 334 (citations omitted).
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III. LOSS OF CHANCE UNDER NEBRASKA LAW
Nebraska is one of the few states that still refuses to adopt the loss
of chance doctrine and instead adheres to the traditional all or nothing
approach.147 Under Nebraska law, a loss of chance argument cannot
be used to establish causation of injury in a medical malpractice
case.148 Instead, under the traditional all or nothing approach, plain-
tiffs in Nebraska must prove it is “more likely than not” that the de-
fendant’s negligence caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.149 This idea has
been codified in the Nebraska Hospital Medical Liability Act, which
provides that “[d]amages recoverable in any action shall be those
losses which have been or shall be sustained by the claimant as a di-
rect and proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful acts as estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence.”150 While plaintiffs
continuously argue that Nebraska should adopt the loss of chance doc-
trine, the Nebraska Supreme Court has repeatedly denied its adop-
tion, stating that “this court has not adopted the loss-of-chance
doctrine, and we shall not adopt it at this time.”151
Since Nebraska has not adopted the loss of chance doctrine, argu-
ments in medical malpractice cases often revolve around whether ex-
pert medical testimony is loss of chance testimony.152 Nebraska courts
will not allow testimony that is based on the loss of chance doctrine
because “an opinion framed in terms of loss of chance would not sus-
tain [the plaintiff’s] burden of establishing that the defendants proxi-
mately caused her injury.”153 Instead, Nebraska law requires “that
‘expert medical testimony must be based on a reasonable degree of
medical certainty or a reasonable probability.’”154 Furthermore,
“ ‘[p]robably’ has been defined . . . as ‘reasonably,’ ‘credibly,’ ‘presuma-
bly,’ ‘in all probability,’ and ‘very likely.’”155 Though an expert does
not have to use the words “reasonable medical certainty,” “[m]edical
expert testimony regarding causation based upon possibility or specu-
147. Rankin v. Stetson, 275 Neb. 775, 787, 749 N.W.2d 460, 469 (2008).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (Reissue 2010).
151. Cohan v. Med. Imaging Consultants, P.C., 297 Neb. 111, 127, 900 N.W.2d 732,
743 (2017).
152. See id.; Richardson v. Children’s Hosp., 280 Neb. 396, 787 N.W.2d 235 (2010);
Rankin, 275 Neb. at 786–87, 749 N.W.2d at 468–69; Gonzales v. Neb. Pediatric
Practice, Inc., 26 Neb. App. 764, 923 N.W.2d 445 (Neb. Ct. App. 2019); Coran v.
Bd. of Regents, No. A-91-971, 1993 Neb. App. LEXIS 283 (Neb. Ct. App. June 15,
1993).
153. Rankin, 275 Neb. at 787, 749 N.W.2d at 469.
154. Edmonds v. IBP, Inc., 239 Neb. 899, 904–05, 479 N.W.2d 754, 757 (1992) (quoting
Hohnstein v. W.C. Frank, 237 Neb. 974, 982, 468 N.W.2d 597, 603 (1991)).
155. Id. at 905, 479 N.W.2d at 757 (quoting Hare v. Watts Trucking Serv., 220 Neb.
403, 370 N.W.2d 143 (1985)).
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lation is insufficient; it must be stated as being at least ‘probable,’ in
other words, more likely than not.”156
However, even though an expert uses the word “chance” or the
phrase “chance at a better outcome,” it does not necessarily mean it is
loss of chance testimony. For example, there is a distinct difference
between (1) a doctor’s negligence “decreas[ing plaintiff’s] chance of a
better outcome,” and (2) “but for” the doctor’s negligence a chance at “a
better outcome would have been probable.”157 This is because a proba-
ble chance of a better outcome means the chance of a better outcome is
above 50%. Moreover, under Nebraska law, “[o]pinions dealing with
proximate causation in a medical malpractice action are required to be
given in terms that express a probability greater than 50 percent.
While a 49–percent chance of a better recovery may be medically sig-
nificant, it does not meet the legal requirements for proof of
causation.”158
Even though the weight of Nebraska law appears to be against
them, plaintiffs continuously cite to Washington v. American Commu-
nity Stores Corp. as demonstrating that Nebraska courts have adopted
the loss of chance doctrine.159 In Washington, the plaintiff brought a
suit against a corporation for permanent injuries caused by a motor
vehicle accident.160 The plaintiff was a twenty-four-year-old man who
had been employed as a parole officer since graduating from college
four months earlier.161 As a result of the injuries sustained in the acci-
dent, the plaintiff was unable to pursue his wrestling career.162 As
part of the plaintiff’s complaint, he alleged a loss in earning capacity
because of his inability to pursue a wrestling career.163 While the
plaintiff had successfully competed in wrestling competitions at the
high school and college levels and was characterized as a prime candi-
date for the U.S. Olympic team, the defendant argued there was no
evidence that he would have been an Olympic wrestler or that he had
been promised a job as a wrestling coach.164
The trial court awarded the plaintiff damages for lost earning ca-
pacity relating to wrestling; the defendant appealed.165 The defendant
156. Fackler v. Genetzky, 263 Neb. 68, 74, 638 N.W.2d 521, 528 (2002) (citing Doe v.
Zedek, 255 Neb. 963, 587 N.W.2d 885 (1999)).
157. Walton v. Patil, 279 Neb. 974, 985, 783 N.W.2d 438, 447 (2010).
158. Id. (citing Rankin, 275 Neb. 775, 749 N.W.2d 460).
159. Washington v. Am. Cmty. Stores Corp., 196 Neb. 624, 244 N.W.2d 286 (1976); see
also Steineke v. Share Health Plan of Neb., Inc., 246 Neb. 374, 381, 518 N.W.2d
904, 909 (1994) (Caporale, J., dissenting) (reasoning the Nebraska Supreme
Court had already adopted the loss of chance doctrine).
160. Washington, 196 Neb. at 625, 244 N.W.2d at 287.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 626, 244 N.W.2d at 288.
164. Id. at 627–28, 630, 244 N.W.2d at 288–90.
165. Id. at 625, 244 N.W.2d at 287.
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argued that the evidence regarding the plaintiff’s wrestling career was
“based upon speculation and conjecture, that evidence of contingent,
uncertain future possibilities, and uncertain future happenings, is
speculative and conjectural and therefore incompetent.”166 The Ne-
braska Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision.167 The rea-
soning the court provided seems lackluster at best. The court stated,
“[a]s we have pointed out such specific evidence is unnecessary for the
plaintiff to recover under a general allegation of damage. But, more
importantly, in this case the plaintiff offered evidence of the earning
capacity of coaches and wrestlers.”168 While the court did not specifi-
cally state it had adopted the loss of chance doctrine, plaintiffs still
argue that it did based on the dissenting opinion found in Steineke v.
Share Health Plan of Nebraska.169 In this dissenting opinion the
judge states, “it seems to me that wittingly or unwittingly, wisely or
unwisely, this court has recognized loss of chance as an element of tort
damages [in Washington].”170 However, in Cohan, the court ruled that
it “do[es] not find this language controlling, especially in view of the
more recent case of Rankin v. Stetson.”171
The Nebraska Supreme Court has suggested three distinct reasons
for its reluctance to adopt the loss of chance doctrine.172 First, “adop-
tion of the loss-of-chance doctrine . . . would create unwarranted liabil-
ity in other cases and other medical contexts.”173 The court reasoned
that it would reduce causation standards to require only a “mere pos-
sibility” instead of the traditional preponderance of the evidence.174
Second, the court worried that adopting the loss of chance doctrine
would cause it to spread to other areas of the law.175 Finally, it rea-
soned that adopting the loss of chance doctrine would “prove contra-
dictory to the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act, under which
the claimant may recover damages only for those losses that are the
direct and proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful actions, as es-
tablished by a preponderance of the evidence.”176
166. Id. at 626, 244 N.W.2d at 288.
167. Id. at 625, 244 N.W.2d at 287.
168. Id. at 630, 244 N.W.2d at 290.
169. Steineke v. Share Health Plan of Neb., Inc., 246 Neb. 374, 381, 518 N.W.2d 904,
909 (1994) (Caporale, J., dissenting).
170. Id.
171. Cohan v. Med. Imaging Consultants, P.C., 297 Neb. 111, 125–26, 900 N.W.2d
732, 742 (2017) (citing Rankin v. Stetson, 275 Neb. 775, 787, 749 N.W.2d 460, 469
(2008)).
172. See id. at 124–25, 127, 900 N.W.2d at 741–43.
173. Id. at 124–25, 900 N.W.2d at 741.
174. Id. at 125, 900 N.W.2d at 741.
175. Id. at 125, 900 N.W.2d at 741–42.
176. Id. at 127, 900 N.W.2d at 742–43 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (Reissue
2010)).
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IV. NEBRASKA SHOULD ADOPT THE DISTINCT
COMPENSABLE INJURY APPROACH TO THE LOSS
OF CHANCE DOCTRINE
After examining the different approaches taken around the coun-
try regarding the loss of chance doctrine, it is clear that Nebraska
should adopt the distinct compensable injury approach. This Part will
first examine the three reasons the Nebraska Supreme Court opposes
the adoption of the loss of chance doctrine and why these three rea-
sons are not persuasive in the face of the benefits, advantages, and
more equitable outcomes produced by the distinct compensable injury
approach. Next, this Part will discuss the multiple policy arguments
that support the adoption of the distinct compensable injury approach.
A. Why the Nebraska Supreme Court Is Misguided in
Refusing to Adopt the Loss of Chance Doctrine
The first reason the court provides is that it fears adopting the loss
of chance doctrine will reduce the traditional standards of proof for
causation to a “mere possibility” instead of a preponderance of the evi-
dence.177 By making this assertion, the Nebraska Supreme Court is
following the same logic that the South Carolina Supreme Court used
in Owings.178 This argument alleges that the loss of chance doctrine,
in any permutation, allows plaintiffs to recover damages when they
are incapable of proving negligence by a preponderance of the evi-
dence because it allows recovery when the patient would have had an
unfavorable outcome more than 50% of the time.179 The argument
continues that allowing recovery in this situation virtually eliminates
traditional tort law causation standards and replaces them with dam-
ages awards for mere possibilities of negligence.180
However, as seen above, adopting the distinct compensable injury
approach does not allow for recovery based on mere possibilities of
negligence. Instead, it requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of
the harm—the loss of chance of survival or a better outcome—by a
preponderance of the evidence, which is consistent with traditional
tort principles.181 Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate their harm by a
preponderance of the evidence undermines the concern that adoption
will result in a deviation from the traditional causation standard al-
ready followed in Nebraska.182 Courts that follow the distinct compen-
177. Id. at 125, 900 N.W.2d at 741.
178. Jones v. Owings, 456 S.E.2d 371 (S.C. 1995).
179. Id. at 373–74.
180. Id.
181. See Zilich, supra note 27, at 692–99.
182. See id. (explaining that the distinct compensable injury approach does not reduce
traditional causation principles and still requires the plaintiff to prove the ele-
ments of the cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence).
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sable injury approach explicitly state that they are not eliminating the
traditional causation standards but are instead adopting a new form
of recovery that allows plaintiffs to recover damages to which they are
entitled.183
Second, the Nebraska Supreme Court worries the loss of chance
doctrine will expand beyond medical malpractice to other areas of the
law. The court explained this concern by providing the following hypo-
thetical: “For example, does an unsuccessful litigant have a cause of
action where an attorney’s failure to object to evidence negligently re-
duced the chance of success by some degree?”184 Again, this argument
does not hold up. First, the court appears to have already expanded
the use of the doctrine beyond medical malpractice in Washington.185
The court is correct in thinking that the loss of chance doctrine can be
applied to a large variety of cases, including legal malpractice, failure
to warn, failure to rescue, and informed consent cases.186 However,
this expanded liability is actually a positive factor for the doctrine.
The purpose of negligence law is to award damages when someone has
been harmed by the negligence of another. Negligent individuals
should be held liable for their negligence, and adopting this approach
ensures this can be done efficiently. It is essential to remember that a
lost chance has value.187 That means if an individual lost a chance at
winning a case due to a lawyer’s negligence, or she lost the chance of
being rescued, she deserves to be compensated for that lost chance.
The primary requirement should be that a plaintiff can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the loss occurred and that the de-
fendant caused the loss. Furthermore, if the court is concerned with
the loss of chance doctrine being applied in other areas of the law, it
can expressly state that it is only adopting the loss of chance doctrine
in cases involving medical malpractice.
Finally, the court is concerned that the loss of chance doctrine runs
contrary to the Nebraska Hospital Medical Liability Act, which only
allows plaintiffs to recover damages that they can prove were caused
by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.188 This would be
true if the court adopted the relaxed standard of proof approach be-
183. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
184. Cohan v. Med. Imaging Consultants, P.C., 297 Neb. 111, 125, 900 N.W.2d 732,
742 (2017).
185. Washington v. Am. Cmty. Stores Corp., 196 Neb. 624, 244 N.W.2d 286 (1976)
(holding plaintiff could recover for lost chance of an Olympic wrestling career due
to injuries caused by a car accident).
186. Fischer, supra note 4, at 606 (discussing the various legal areas where the loss of
chance doctrine can be applied).
187. Id. at 617–19; see Stephen F. Brennwald, Comment, Proving Causation in “Loss
of a Chance” Cases: A Proportional Approach, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 766–68
(1985); Zilich, supra note 27, at 684–85.
188. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (Reissue 2010).
1036 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1014
cause that approach reduces the level of causation needed and, there-
fore, does not require the plaintiff to prove causation by a
preponderance of the evidence.189 However, that would not be the case
under the distinct compensable injury approach because, under this
approach, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant caused their
loss of chance by a preponderance of the evidence.190
Through examination, it is clear that the reasons listed by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court are lackluster and can be refuted. Though
these reasons may point out flaws with the relaxed standard of proof
approach, none of the reasons are strong enough to show that the
adoption of the distinct compensable injury approach would be inap-
propriate.191 Even if the Nebraska Supreme Court is still hesitant,
there are a multitude of policy reasons in support of the loss of chance
doctrine that should persuade the court to adopt it.
B. Policy Reasons Supporting Nebraska’s Adoption of the
Loss of Chance Doctrine
The loss of chance doctrine has gained extreme popularity among
the majority of courts in this country, and Nebraska should follow
suit.192 The doctrine is essential both to protect injured patients and
to prevent future medical malpractice incidents. Under the traditional
all or nothing approach, “if a patient had a 49% chance of survival,
and the [doctor’s negligence] caused that chance to drop to zero,” then
the doctor would not be held liable.193 “Thus, the all or nothing rule
provides a ‘blanket release from liability for doctors and hospitals any
time there [is] less than a 50 percent chance of survival, regardless of
how flagrant the negligence.’”194 This is precisely why the loss of
chance doctrine needs to be adopted. A doctor should not be allowed to
negligently care for a patient and avoid liability solely because the pa-
tient’s chance of survival is below 50%.195 The Kansas Supreme Court
explained this perfectly by stating:
The reasoning of the district court herein [to reject the loss of chance as a
distinct compensable injury] . . . in essence, declares open season on critically
ill or injured persons as care providers would be free of liability for even the
189. Férot, supra note 60, at 615–16.
190. See Zilich, supra note 27, at 692–99.
191. As alluded to above, Nebraska should not adopt the relaxed standard of proof
approach because it does not follow traditional tort law principles and it is likely
to overcompensate plaintiffs. This is because under this approach, courts award
full damages based on a relaxed standard of causation instead of damages based
on the specific loss of chance caused by the negligent defendant. See supra section
II.C.
192. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
193. Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 829 (Mass. 2008).
194. Id. at 829–30 (citing Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 477 (Wash.
1983)).
195. See Evatt, supra note 36, at 994.
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grossest malpractice if the patient had only a fifty-fifty chance of surviving the
disease or injury even with proper treatment.196
In his Yale Law Review article, Professor King provided a multi-
tude of reasons why courts should adopt the loss of chance doctrine.197
First and foremost, the traditional all or nothing approach “subverts
the deterrent objectives of tort law by denying recovery for the effects
of conduct that causes statistically demonstrable losses.”198 Further-
more, the all or nothing approach does not serve the primary aim “of
fairly allocating the costs and risks of human injuries.”199 Most impor-
tantly, the traditional all or nothing approach “fails to ensure that vic-
tims, who incur the real harm of losing their opportunity for a better
outcome, are fairly compensated for their loss.”200
Additionally, it is essential for courts to adopt the loss of chance
doctrine because in these cases it was the defendant’s negligence that
effectively made it impossible to determine whether or not the patient
would have survived had he or she received appropriate care, and “it
is particularly unjust to deny the person recovery for being unable ‘to
demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have happened in
circumstances that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to pass.’”201
Nebraska should adopt the loss of chance doctrine to not only fairly
compensate injured patients but also to protect future victims of medi-
cal malpractice. If Nebraska refuses to adopt the loss of chance doc-
trine, it is telling sick and vulnerable individuals that their precious
chance of survival has no value and should be ignored.
One final reason noted by other jurisdictions reluctant to adopt the
loss of chance doctrine is the fear that it will sharply increase the
number of medical malpractice cases.202 However, statistical data re-
pudiates this concern. The best list available for determining the num-
ber of cases filed is the list of claims that medical malpractice insurers
paid in states that have adopted the doctrine.203 The federal govern-
ment requires medical malpractice insurers to report each time they
pay a claim for one of their insureds.204 The database that collects this
data is the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) maintained by
196. Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 180 (Kan. 1994) (quoting Roberson v. Coun-
selman, 686 P.2d 149, 160 (Kan. 1984)); see Evatt, supra note 36, at 994.
197. See King, supra note 43.
198. Id. at 1377.
199. Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 466 N.E.2d 500, 504 (Mass. 1984) (Abrams, J.,
concurring).
200. Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 830 (Mass. 2008) (citing Delaney, 873
P.2d 175).
201. Id. at 831 (quoting Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 631 (4th Cir. 1966)).
202. See Férot, supra note 60, at 607–09.
203. See Koch, supra note 1, at 619–20; NPDB Data, NAT’L PRAC. DATA BANK, https://
www.npdb.hrsa.gov/analysistool [https://perma.unl.edu/KM75-S5ZX] (last visited
Feb. 22, 2021).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (2018).
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the United States Department of Health and Human Services
(USDHHS).205 The data compiled by the USDHHS in the NPDB
shows that there is no obvious effect on the number of claims being
paid after a state adopts the loss of chance doctrine.206 While the
number of claims being paid does not directly correlate to the number
of medical malpractice cases being filed, it is a strong signal that
adopting the loss of chance doctrine does not significantly impact the
number of cases.
V. CONCLUSION
For the time being, it looks like Mary is not going to be able to
recover anything from the doctor who negligently decreased Lloyd’s
chance of survival. Though this Comment argues against the ap-
proach taken by the Nebraska Supreme Court, that stance remains
the law in Nebraska. However, Nebraska should adopt the distinct
compensable injury approach to the loss of chance doctrine because it
is consistent with traditional tort law principles, provides vulnerable
patients with a form of recovery that can help protect them from the
negligence of their healthcare professionals, and, most importantly,
because the reasons the Nebraska Supreme Court previously listed in
opposition to the loss of chance doctrine are not persuasive. The dis-
tinct compensable injury approach allows patients to hold their doc-
tors accountable even when they have less than a 50% chance of
survival or a better outcome while still requiring plaintiffs to demon-
strate by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was at
fault for their lost chance. If Nebraska were to adopt the distinct com-
pensable injury approach to the loss of chance doctrine, the state could
better provide injured plaintiffs with the valuable protection they
need. No longer will doctors be immune to liability in cases involving
patients who happened to have a chance of survival below 50%.
Over the coming years, Nebraska attorneys will need to continue to
fight for the adoption of the loss of chance doctrine, and only then will
the Nebraska Supreme Court see why it should adopt the doctrine.
Without the dedicated work of attorneys, the only other possible
chance would be the Nebraska Legislature choosing to adopt a statute
allowing for loss of chance suits. Either way, only time will tell if Mary
or people like Mary will ever be able to recover damages against negli-
205. NPDB Data, supra note 203.
206. See Koch, supra note 1, at 619–24 (examining the effect of the loss of chance doc-
trine on the number of cases heard by the courts). Koch examines multiple states
that have adopted the doctrine including Wyoming, Illinois, and Ohio. Id. Each
state shows that there was not any lasting increase in the number of malpractice
cases being heard by the courts but rather the number of cases had often actually
gone down. Id. However, Koch mentions this may be due to a lag in reporting by
the insurance companies. Id. at 620 n.120.
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gent doctors who are now shielded by the all or nothing approach
taken by the Nebraska Supreme Court.
